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Though the title suggests a phenomenological account of art and, in fact, has some
important and insightful things to say about art, this work focuses primarily on the
ontological status of “fictional beings” and the question of “representation” in art and in
experience more generally. Paskow makes a case for a “realist” aesthetic. The first part
of the book, which provides examples from literature and painting, culminates in a
discussion of why fictional beings can be important to us. The second part of the book is
almost exclusively devoted to a consideration of painting. It illustrates how a realist
aesthetic can be brought to bear on painting and develops this aesthetic in relation to this
particular art form. Throughout Paskow is concerned not only with what we should take
art to be, but why it should matter to us.

This work is genuinely “phenomenological” in the sense that it attends directly to
our experience of the work of art, especially the painting. Unlike much American current
literature in continental philosophy, it is not primarily a commentary on the texts of
continental philosophers who have addressed the topic at hand. In fact, for good or ill,
Paskow ignores the 20th century phenomenological literature on art and painting—Geiger,
Heidegger, Ingarden, Dufrenne, Merleau-Ponty among others. The body of literature that
he does explicitly take up (Chapter I) is contemporary analytic aesthetics: especially
Walton and Yanal, but also Carroll, Boruah, Rosebury among others. However varied,
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complex, and insightful the work of these philosophers is, Paskow takes them all to be
committed to some sort of representationalism. On his account, they are all committed to
an orientation characterized by a subject-object split and thus end up quarreling over
subjectivistic and objectivistic accounts of art. Paskow’s realism is not an objectivism.

He finds his orientation in the Heidegger of Being and Time, the Heidegger of
phenomenological ontology. Chapters II and III draw on Being and Time for an account
of how we might have a non-instrumental relation to things and “why and how others
matter” to us. Paskow argues that Heidegger’s great contribution in Being and Time is to
show us the way out of the false alternative between egocentricity (and
anthropomorphism) and theocentrism (God’s eye point of view, objectivism). This false
alternative derives from Cartesian representationalism. He recognizes that Heidegger’s
later developments have to do, at least in part, with Heidegger’s concern for a residue of
egocentrism and anthropomorphism in his early work. In addition, the early Heidegger
has little to say about art and painting. Most Heideggerians concerned with Paskow’s
questions turn to Heidegger’s Origin of the Work of Art. Paskow thinks that the later
Heidegger “has not articulated a full or convincing theory of art.”(31) Paskow does not
find “sufficient clarity in the terms ‘earth,’ ‘world,’ ‘truth,’…and so forth….” (30).

In the introduction Paskow discusses briefly Husserl’s contribution toward a
phenomenology of painting, most of which can be found in Husserliana XXIII: Phantasie,
Bildbewusstsein, Errinerung. Paskow asserts that Husserl failed to answer the question
that he is posing, though Husserl’s accounts “are suggestive and, indirectly and
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unintentionally, indicate the kind of epistemological position that I defend.”(21) Further,
Husserl “lacked the courage of his intuitions.”(24) Paskow also claims that Husserl never
developed an account of human experience as “being-in-the-world.” This reviewer
would argue that Husserl’s account approximates Paskow’s position quite intentionally,
that Husserl provides a critique of representationalism, and that Heidegger adopts and
adapts this from Husserl. Be that as it may, phenomenology for Paskow provides the
way to a realist aesthetic.

Yet it is a peculiar realism, for with regard to the things of experience, including
art objects and paintings, Paskow also calls his approach Neo-Kantian and refers to his
own “Neo-Kantian addendum” (114) to Heidegger’s account. He argues that Heidegger
in Being and Time “seems to be unconsciously admitting his belief in the existence of a
phenomenologically inaccessible realm of things in themselves.”(113-4) Paskow may be
right about some of the formulations of Being and Time, but this is the very reason that
Heidegger abandons the unfinished work. Clearly and explicitly Heidegger wished to
abandon the Kantian “thing-in-itself” which he, following Husserl, saw as a function of
the Cartesian tradition of representationalism. Paskow’s position thus remains captive to
the representationalism that he claims to overcome. He cannot find a way to reconcile
the historical and cultural context of our experience of things with what he sees to be
“naïve” common-sensical realism. But he does not wish to give up any claim on the
thing in itself, so he suggests, but does not develop, the notion that our experience of
things is analogous to the thing in itself. Accordingly, he suggests further that the things
of our experience are symbols “at one level.”
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As one might expect from this kind of existential Neo-Kantian realism, Paskow is
more interested in other persons than in the thinginess of things. In a kind of summary,
he states that his “contention is that paintings are at base about others—on the face of it,
fictional others, but in an important and overlooked sense, “real” others—their stories,
their concerns are, whether we acknowledge them or not, our stories, our concerns.”(150)
Things, he goes on to say, “are always proxies for people.”(150) Even abstract art tells
the stories of others. For his account of the experience of others, Paskow takes his cue
from Being and Time and its presentation of two modes of relation with the other:
leaping ahead and leaping in. Paskow argues that these two alternatives are not adequate
to our experience and suggests a third mode: allowing the other entry into my life. This
mode is the appropriate mode for coming to art and paintings in particular. We can and
should allow the fictional other into our lives.

After dealing with the experience of things (Chapter II) and others (Chapter III),
in Chapter IV (“Why and How Painting Matters”) Paskow turns to the experience of
painting. He suggests that the experience has three levels: 1) the unreflective visual and
affective experience, 2) the spectator’s reflective effort to ascertain what the work is
about, and 3) an evaluative and contextualizing conceptual placement of the work
according to a particular purpose. He calls this last level, the level of theory and
interpretation. He argues that philosophers have too much focused on this third level at
the cost of the first two levels and the direct experience of the painting in which we allow
it entry into our lives. The third level is inevitably “distancing.”(151) Using the example
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of Vermeer’s The Woman Holding a Balance, Paskow attempts to provide a
phenomenological account of the pre-theoretical experience of this painting. Paskow has
much to say about the experience of painting and about this painting by Vermeer in
particular. He suggests that we enter into the world (or better, “subworld”) of the
painting “as though it were a dream of our own.”(181) There is only one world but there
are many subworlds. In this way, Paskow can account for the differences and
disagreements about paintings but also the value of entering into the conversation about
the painting and engaging these differences and disagreements. He appeals to the
Gadamerian concept of the fusion of horizons to make sense of this experience.

In the fifth and final chapter (“For and Against Interpretation”) Paskow discusses
what he takes to be the seven basic schools of interpretation today: 1) traditional
(formalism or new criticism), 2) psychological, 3) psychosocial, 4) sociohistorical, 5)
subjectivist, 6) ethical, and 7) deconstructionist. A peculiarity of Paskow’s terminology is
his distinction of his own phenomenological approach from “interpretive” approaches. It
is peculiar inasmuch as Heidegger is justifiably considered a major influence on the
interpretive turn of much of recent “theory.” The Heidegger of Being and Time calls his
own phenomenology hermeneutical. The work in hermeneutics by Gadamer and Ricoeur
is scarcely mentioned by Paskow (only in the last few pages), though he acknowledges in
a footnote (244) that his own position is best supplemented by “reception” theory. The
developers of reception theory, Jauss and Iser (neither of whom for whatever reason are
listed in the bibliography) were much influenced by Gadamer. As noted above, Paskow
is “against” interpretation insofar as it distracts from the immediate experience of the
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artwork. Interpretive theory may be dogmatic and reductive. Yet Paskow is not simply
against theory. This higher level of reflection may indeed provide important insight into
the artwork, but any theoretical approach oversteps its bounds if it claims to be the only
and final truth or if it does not pay sufficient attention to the work itself.. Paskow claims
that the various theoretical approaches may be complementary to one another and that the
theoretical approach to the artwork should be kept in a dialectical tension with the direct
experience of the artwork. At one point he suggests an “amalgamation of both
phenomenological and interpretive responses.”(237) To illuminate this tension, Paskow
chooses three of the theories (all “unmasking”) and provides three interpretations of the
Vermeer painting to contrast with his own interpretation in the previous chapter: feminist,
Marxist, and deconstructionist. His first two interpretations are quite credible and
persuasive, unlike the deconstructionist interpretation, though of these Paskow is clearly
most interested in the deconstructionist. His commentary on Derrida and
deconsstructionism is stronger, though unfortunately most of it is to be found in the
footnotes.
The book concludes with a summary of his position which he characterizes as
conceding the relativity of alternative interpretations without endorsing relativism. There
is always an element of undecidability, ambiguity, and uncertainty in the understanding
and interpretation of an artwork. There is no definitive interpretation, though some are
better than others. These claims about interpretation are not at all unusual,
nothwithstanding Paskow’s claims in the introduction and throughout the work for the
unusual and bold character of position. What philosophically is most interesting is how
and why these claims about interpretation are made—how and why one can came
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relativity without relativism. To show the basis for his view Paskow refers both to his
own Neo-Kantianism and a regulative ideal of the best interpretation and to Aristotle and
Aquinas. Aristotle he says provides “a theoretical underpinning” (238) to his claims
about cross-cultural and trans-historical interpretation. Paskow also refers to his own
“quasi-universalistic position.”(239) Put in historical terms, can one have one’s Aristotle
and Kant too? One might argue, as Paskow does implicitly, that this appeal to Aristotle
and Kant characterizes Being and Time, the text that provides the lead for Paskow’s own
interpretive approach. But Paskow’s The Paradoxes of Art leaves the reader wishing for
a more extensive account of a phenomenology that is both Aristotelian and Kantian.
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